|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
// - CreateTaskResult (task-based execution with { task } object)
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
statusMessages.push(`Task created: ${taskId}`);
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
// - CreateTaskResult (task-based execution with { task } object)
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
data: `Roots updated: ${response?.roots?.length} root(s) received from client`,
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
text: `Resource ${resourceId}: This is a plaintext resource created at ${timestamp}`,
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
`Resource ${resourceId}: This is a base64 blob created at ${timestamp}`
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
await taskStore.updateTaskStatus(taskId, "working", `${STAGES[i]}...`);
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
statusMessages.push(`Task created: ${taskId}`);
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
critical
|
—
|
SQL string concatenation detected
|
D
SQL Injection
|
—
|
—
|
Description
SQL string concatenation detected
Code Snippet
response = `Started simulated resource updated notifications for session ${sessionId} at a 5 second ...
Remediation
Use parameterized queries with placeholders
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-D002
|
|
high
|
—
|
ML classifier detected prompt injection pattern
|
G
Tool Poisoning
|
—
|
—
|
Description
ML classifier detected prompt injection pattern
Code Snippet
`# Research Report: ${topic}
## Research Parameters
- **Topic**: ${state.topic}
${state.clarificati...
Remediation
Review and sanitize the detected text for potential injection attempts
Confidence
medium
Rule ID
MCP-ML-001
|
|
high
|
—
|
Exfiltration pattern detected in tool or code
|
G
Tool Poisoning
|
—
|
—
|
Description
Exfiltration pattern detected in tool or code
Code Snippet
* - "resourceLink": Returns a link to access the resource later.
Remediation
Remove instructions that request sensitive data extraction
Confidence
medium
Rule ID
MCP-G006
|
|
high
|
—
|
Outbound connection to dynamically constructed URL
|
M
Hidden Network
|
—
|
—
|
Description
Outbound connection to dynamically constructed URL
Code Snippet
const response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });
Remediation
Use allowlist for outbound connections; declare all endpoints in manifest; avoid dynamic URL construction
Confidence
medium
Rule ID
MCP-M003
|
|
high
|
—
|
Potential timing-based covert channel detected
|
M
Hidden Network
|
—
|
—
|
Description
Potential timing-based covert channel detected
Code Snippet
setTimeout(resolve, stepDuration * 1000)
Remediation
Review sleep/delay patterns for data-dependent timing; normalize timing behavior
Confidence
low
Rule ID
MCP-M002
|
|
medium
|
—
|
Tool description contains suspicious Unicode characters
|
G
Tool Poisoning
|
—
|
—
|
Description
Tool description contains suspicious Unicode characters
Code Snippet
text: `⚠️ User cancelled the elicitation dialog.`,
Remediation
Remove Unicode control characters and confusables
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-G002
|
|
medium
|
—
|
Tool description contains suspicious Unicode characters
|
G
Tool Poisoning
|
—
|
—
|
Description
Tool description contains suspicious Unicode characters
Code Snippet
expect(result.content[0].text).toContain('⚠️');
Remediation
Remove Unicode control characters and confusables
Confidence
high
Rule ID
MCP-G002
|